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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Securities law has emerged as an area of law not typically as-
sociated with traditional public environmental law.1 However, se-
curities law has begun to permeate into environmental law.2 As the 
catastrophic physical and financial effects of climate change be-
come more apparent every day, shareholders and institutional in-
vestors have demanded that publicly traded companies analyze 
and address the risks and opportunities associated with climate 
change and disclose them in their annual filings.3 These demands 
have only increased with the release of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report, which warned of the cat-
astrophic effects associated with a 1.5 degrees Celsius rise in global 
temperature.4 Many countries have begun encouraging, or even re-
quiring, climate-related disclosures; many organizations have be-
gun to voluntarily disclose their risks.5 Although climate-related 
issues can be viewed as a material issue that triggers disclosure, 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
has been lax with regulation and enforcement of mandatory 
 
1 See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (discussing how anti-trust, bankruptcy, corporate, 
and securities laws are the areas that roadblock environmental progress).  
2 Id. at 165–71 
3 Jeffrey M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 284 (2009); see generally California Public Em-
ployees’ Retirement System et al., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate 
Risk Disclosure 6 (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/rules/peti-
tions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [https://perma.cc/83F5-BDJV] [hereinafter California 
Petition]. 
4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 4 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT]. 
5 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES (TCFD), 2018 
STATUS REPORT i (2018), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/08/FINAL-2018-TCFD-Status-Report-092518.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8XSR-9ST6]. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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reporting as it relates to climate change.6 As one of the world’s larg-
est greenhouse gas emitters,7 the United States (“U.S.”) must take 
steps to address emissions concerns. In addition to companies vol-
untarily taking action against climate change, government action 
will play a vital role as the world transitions to a low-carbon econ-
omy.8 
This Note argues that new legislation calling for mandatory 
reporting on climate-related risks and opportunities – aligned with 
the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) 
Recommendations – is required to fill the informational gap that is 
hindering the transition to a low-carbon economy. Part II provides 
a history of financial disclosures and how climate change has been 
interpreted under current law. Part III discusses the current and 
expected financial consequences arising from physical climate 
risks and global action, and provides an overview of the ways in-
stitutional investors can make a significant impact on the shift to 
a low-carbon economy. Part IV provides an overview of the TCFD 
and their Recommendations.9 Part V discusses why climate-re-
lated financial disclosures have failed thus far – namely, by only 
having an interpretive rule, which does not carry the “force of law,” 
clarify mandatory reporting requirements as it relates to climate-
related information.  
Part VI recommends that Congress pass new legislation re-
quiring mandatory climate-related financial disclosures aligned 
with the TCFD Recommendations, using the body of the Climate 
 
6 See David Gelles, S.E.C. is Criticized for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk 
Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/busi-
ness/energy-environment/sec-is-criticized-for-lax-enforcement-of-climate-risk-
disclosure.html [https://perma.cc/CF6E-Y7BB]. 
7 Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data 
[https://perma.cc/E669-6MYB]. 
8 See Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO, BlackRock, to CEOs (Jan. 
14, 2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-
letter [https://perma.cc/MH7N-WZP3]. (“Over the next few years, one of the most 
important questions we will face is the scale and scope of government action on 
climate change, which will generally define the speed with which we move to a 
low-carbon economy.”) [hereinafter Letter from Larry Fink]. 
9 TCFD, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-
RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES iii–v (June 29, 2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W2BA-3EFE] [hereinafter TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS]; see infra 
Part IV. 
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Risk Disclosure Act of 2019 (“CRDA”)10 as a starting point. The 
TCFD Recommendations should be adopted because other coun-
tries and organizations have already expressed their support for 
the Recommendations.11 This new legislation will allow U.S. regu-
lators to take control of climate-related disclosures for the U.S. cap-
ital markets before other jurisdictions can impose disclosure re-
gimes on U.S. issuers and investors. Support from the U.S. will 
also encourage more nations and businesses to support the Recom-
mendations. Furthermore, new legislation is better than a regula-
tion or another interpretive rule because of potential presidential 
influence on the SEC.12 The CRDA does not go far enough because 
it primarily focuses on the climate risks companies are exposed to 
and how those companies intend to manage those risks. The Act 
fails to fully account for the opportunities a company may gain 
from the resulting market changes caused by climate change, such 
as entry into new markets, creation of new products and technolo-
gies, and less energy consumed by fossil-fuel sources during busi-
ness operations through the adoption of renewable energy.  
Part VII provides three administrative alternatives that 
achieve similar results to passing new legislation: (1) use a more 
forceful interpretation of current securities law, then translated 
into a new interpretive rule, to clarify existing climate-related dis-
closure obligations, (2) amend Regulation S-K, and (3) promulgate 
a new regulation. The SEC stated in its 2010 Climate Guidance 
that disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities is 
 
10 The bill has been introduced in both chambers of Congress. S. 2075, 116th 
Cong. (2019); H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. (2019). 
11 TCFD, 2019 STATUS REPORT 110 (2019), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/06/2019-TCFD-Status-Report-FINAL-053119.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WZ5F-9FUR] [hereinafter 2019 STATUS REPORT]. 
12 Although there is a long-held understanding that the SEC is an independ-
ent agency and its Commissioners enjoy removal protection, its independence has 
never been fully established. The Exchange Act is silent on the question of Com-
missioner removal and the Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Board., 561 U.S. 477 (2010), sidestepped the question by deciding the 
case using the parties’ stipulation that SEC Commissioners enjoy removal protec-
tion. See Note, The SEC is Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
781–82 (2013). Because this question has not been answered, legislation is the 
better implementing tool for climate-related financial disclosures, rather than 
regulation, because of the partisan politicking surrounding the issue of climate 
change. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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already mandated under current law;13 however, the SEC did not 
interpret and clarify current laws as forcefully as it should have 
when it released the Guidance. This conclusion is supported by the 
purpose of the Securities Act, accompanying regulations, and the 
fact that many investors state that climate-related risks and op-
portunities are material. New guidance, in addition to further and 
more forcefully clarifying existing reporting requirements, would 
give management less discretion when determining what risks and 
opportunities are material to their company. Amending Regulation 
S-K or promulgating a new regulation are both feasible options but 
will take time to complete because it requires compliance with no-
tice and comment rulemaking. This Note concludes that full disclo-
sure of both climate-related risks and opportunities is essential to 
providing investors with the necessary information required to fi-
nance our future’s health and to ensure a swift transition to a low-
carbon economy. This is best achieved by new climate risk legisla-
tion that aligns with the TCFD Recommendations. 
II. HISTORY AND CURRENT CLIMATE RISK 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 Disclosure requirements are primarily regulated by two acts: 
(1) the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”);14 and (2) the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).15 The SEC has de-
termined, that when enacting the Securities Act, “Congress recog-
nized that investors must have access to accurate information 
important to making investment and voting decisions in order for 
the financial markets to function effectively.”16 The Securities Act 
does not set out specific disclosure requirements; rather, Section 7 
of the Act gives the SEC full authority to determine what infor-
mation issuers must submit, stating that “[t]he Commission shall 
adopt regulations under this subsection requiring each issuer of an 
 
13 See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING 
DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, 11–12 (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XLF-56XW] 
[hereinafter 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE]. 
14 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2018). 
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–qq (2018). 
16 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 23,916, 23,921 (Apr. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 201, 229, 230, 
232, 239, 240 and 249) [hereinafter 2016 Concept Release].  
5
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asset-backed security to disclose, for each tranche or class of secu-
rity, information regarding the assets backing that security.”17 The 
Exchange Act created the SEC – whose mission is to “protect in-
vestors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate 
capital formation”18 – and empowers the SEC to require periodic 
reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securi-
ties.19 The reports are either annual (Form 10-K), quarterly (Form 
10-Q), or on a current basis when a number of specified events oc-
cur.20 Regulation S-X21 and Regulation S-K22 outline the forms 
most often used when a registrant is required to file a disclosure 
form with the SEC. Regulation S-X defines the form, content, and 
requirements for financial disclosures.23 Regulation S-K provides 
instructions for filing forms.24  
Despite neither regulation expressly requiring climate disclo-
sures, the SEC requires, for both registration (Rule 408) and re-
porting (Rule 12b-20), that, in addition to information expressly 
required by regulation, the disclosure of “such further material in-
formation, if any, as may be necessary to make the required state-
ments, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading.”25 The term “material” has caused much confusion 
since it was first introduced into federal securities law in 1933. Alt-
hough still vague and ambiguous, it can be defined as a trigger for 
when there is a legal obligation to disclose facts or information.26 
To clear confusion around the term (although to little or no avail), 
the Supreme Court, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., held 
that, for facts or information to be considered “material,” “there 
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
 
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(1). 
18 About the SEC, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/CR8D-6KTD]. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 78m; See, e.g., Form 8-K, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/TT6Z-DV6X]. 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
21 See generally 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (2020). 
22 See generally id. pt. 229. 
23 Id. § 210.1–01(a). 
24 Id. § 229.10(a). 
25 Id. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20. 
26 Dale Oesterle, The Overused and Under-defined Notion of “Material” in 
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 167 (2011).  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” This defini-
tion applies to Section 14 of the Exchange Act (in the proxy-solici-
tation context).27 The SEC then adopted this reasonable investor 
standard in its 1982 amendments to the regulatory definition of 
“material” in Rules 408 and 12b-20.28 Six years later, in Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, the issue of materiality in federal securities law re-
turned to the Supreme Court, this time for application to Section 
10 of the Exchange Act.29 The Court chose to adopt the reasonable 
investor standard from TSC Industries.30 The reason the Court had 
to define “material” for these two Sections is because the SEC does 
not include a definition for “material” in those accompanying reg-
ulations.31 
The confusion surrounding “material” has continued since the 
Court attempted to shed light on the term, and the term particu-
larly sparks confusion when applied to climate-related issues. In-
vestor groups, curious about how climate change affects the busi-
nesses in which they have invested, have been calling for voluntary 
disclosure of companies’ environmental policies since the 1990s.32 
In 2007, a consortium of environmental groups, institutional inves-
tors, and state officials – believing that climate change is a mate-
rial issue and should be disclosed33 – petitioned the SEC to release 
guidance on how climate-related issues are interpreted under ex-
isting mandatory disclosure rules and regulations.34 This call was 
answered in 2010 when the SEC issued an interpretive release 
providing guidance on the subject.35 The SEC interpreted four non-
financial statement provisions within Regulation S-K that could 
 
27 426 U.S. 428, 449 (1976). 
28 “The term ‘material,’ when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing 
of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters 
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach 
importance in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. The definition in Rule 405 is practically identical. See id. § 
230.405. For the 1982 amendments, see Adoption of Integrated Disclosure Sys-
tem, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,436 (Mar. 16, 1982) (for Rule 405), and see id. at 
11,465 (for Rule 12b-2). 
29 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
30 Id. at 232. 
31 See 17 C.F.R §§ 240.10b-1 to -21, 240.14a-1 to -21. 
32 McFarland, supra note 3, at 284. 
33 California Petition, supra note 3, at 6. 
34 McFarland, supra note 3, at 284. 
35 See generally 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13. 
7
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trigger climate-related disclosures: Item 101, “Description of Busi-
ness,” which requires disclosure of compliance with federal, state, 
and local provisions that relate to the protection of the environ-
ment and have a material effect on capital expenditures, earnings, 
and competitive position36; Item 103, “Legal Proceedings,” which 
requires disclosure of any material pending legal proceedings to 
which the company, any of its subsidiaries, or its property, is a 
party);37 Item 303, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis,” 
which requires disclosure of known trends, events, demands, com-
mitments, and uncertainties reasonably likely to have a material 
effect on financial condition or operating performance38; and Item 
505(c), “Risk Factors,” which requires “a discussion of the most sig-
nificant factors that make an investment speculative or risky.”39 
Items 101 and 103 require express disclosure of compliance with, 
and litigation arising from, environmental law, whereas Items 303 
and 505(c) leave it to management to determine how environmen-
tal issues are implicated. 
After stating what four Items could trigger a climate-related 
disclosure obligation, the 2010 Guidance focused on four business 
factors management should consider. The first is the impact of leg-
islation and regulation.40 This requires a company to determine the 
likelihood that a legislative or regulatory body will enact climate-
related laws, and, if so, whether those laws will have a material 
effect on the company’s operations or financial condition.41 The sec-
ond are the impacts from treaties or international accords.42 This 
requires a company to determine the effect of international agree-
ments, such as the Paris Agreement or EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem.43 The third factor involves the indirect consequences of 
 
36 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii). 
37 Id. § 229.103. 
38 Id. § 229.303. 
39 Id. § 229.503(c). 
40 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 22–24. 
41 FATIMA MARIA AHMAD, BEYOND THE HORIZON: CORPORATE REPORTING ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2017), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09/be-
yond-horizon-corporate-reporting-climate-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/75YH-
G3UR]. An example of an act triggering climate disclosures under this provision 
of the 2010 Climate Guidance would be the Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018. 
See, e.g., Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018, S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018). 
42 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 24. 
43 AHMAD, supra note 41, at 5. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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regulation or business trends.44 This could include demand-side ef-
fects of legal, technological, political, and scientific developments 
regarding climate change, as well as reputational impacts.45 The 
fourth are the physical impacts of climate change.46 This focuses 
on the effects climate change has on a company’s operations and 
performance, such as impacts from increased weather severity, 
sea-level rise, and water availability and quality.47 In the 2010 Cli-
mate Guidance, the SEC also recognized that, because the Ex-
change Act is designed to protect investors and disclosure is within 
management’s discretion, doubts as to materiality should be re-
solved in favor of the investors.48  
Although this interpretative guidance seemed to signal a 
much-needed change in the financial disclosure realm, minimal 
improvements were made. In 2014, Ceres,49 a sustainability fo-
cused non-governmental organization (“NGO”), released a report 
which found that the SEC was not prioritizing the financial risks 
and opportunities of climate change and showed a lack of commit-
ment to the 2010 Guidance when issuing comment letters.50 Simi-
lar to the events that led to the SEC releasing the 2010 Climate 
Guidance, proponents of improved requirements and enforcement 
began sending letters to the SEC, calling for “greater scrutiny of 
climate-related disclosures.”51 In response, the SEC issued a Con-
cept Release on “Business and Financial Disclosure Required by 
Regulation S-K,” which sought public comments on whether the 
 
44 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 25–26. 
45 AHMAD, supra note 41, at 5–6. 
46 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 26–27. 
47 Id. at 26–27. 
48 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 11 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 428, 448 (1976)). 
49 “Ceres is a sustainability nonprofit organization working with the most in-
fluential investors and companies to build leadership and drive solutions through-
out the economy. Through powerful networks and advocacy, Ceres tackles the 
world’s biggest sustainability challenges, including climate change, water scarcity 
and pollution, and inequitable workplaces.” About Us, CERES (last visited Apr. 24, 
2020), https://www.ceres.org/about-us. 
50 See JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & 
CORPORATE CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING, 4, 25–27 (2014), 
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/cool-response-sec-corporate-climate-
change-reporting?report=view [https://perma.cc/4D2Z-QB8N]. 
51 These proponents included shareholders and lawmakers, comprised of an 
alliance of sixty-two institutional investors, New York City and New York State 
comptrollers, and thirty-five members of Congress. Gelles, supra note 6. 
9
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SEC should consider sustainability-related line-item disclosure, as 
well as materiality standards for sustainability issues.52 The SEC 
received comments from various NGOs and investor groups advo-
cating for mandatory reporting requirements and increased en-
forcement, as well as from industry groups opposed to having fur-
ther regulation on climate risk disclosure.53 Although the current 
SEC Chair, Jay Clayton, expressed support for the 2010 Climate 
Guidance during his Senate confirmation hearing,54 no action has 
been taken since receiving the public comments.55 Furthermore, 
since the 2010 Climate Guidance was issued, Republican Con-
gressman Bill Posey has spearheaded efforts opposing the guid-
ance and other climate change regulation. For example, in an ap-
propriations bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 
July 2016, Congressman Posey introduced an amendment that 
prohibits the SEC from using funds provided by the bill to admin-
ister, enforce, or codify into regulation, specified guidance for pub-
lic companies regarding disclosures related to climate change.56    
 
52 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,916; Natalie Nowiski, Rising 
Above the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance 
to the Energy Sector, 39 ENERGY L.J. 1, 8 (2018). 
53 Nowiski, supra note 52, at 8–9. The arguments by industry groups included 
that: “(1) environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues were sufficiently ad-
dressed in the 2010 Guidelines; (2) the SEC lacked authority to require such dis-
closures; (3) materiality in the context of fiduciary duties only could extend to 
financial interests; (4) further regulation would unfairly burden reporting enti-
ties; and (5) the disclosure of such information would be advantageous to compet-
itors.” Id.  
54 Linda M. Lowson, Global Climate Change and Sustainability Financial Re-
porting: An Unstoppable Force with or without Trump, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Apr. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/30/global-
climate-change-and-sustainability-financial-reporting-an-unstoppable-force-
with-or-without-trump/ [https://perma.cc/ECK6-4N3C]. 
55 In January 2020, the SEC released a proposed rule for aimed at moderniz-
ing Regulation S-K. Management’s Discussion and Analysis, Selected Financial 
Data, and Supplementary Financial Information, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,068 (proposed 
Feb. 28, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 239, 240, and 249) (2020). 
However, these proposed amendments made no attempt to “address investors’ 
needs for standardized disclosure on climate change risk. Public Statement, Alli-
son Herren Lee, “Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the 
Room (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-
01-30 [https://perma.cc/8QMA-2YFC]. 
56 H. Amendment 1261 to H.R. 5485, 114th Cong. (2016); see Alex Kotch & 
David Sirota, Despite Irma, Florida Congressman Aims to Let Companies Hide 
Climate-Change Risks, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.ibtimes.com/political-capital/despite-irma-florida-congressman-
aims-let-companies-hide-climate-change-risks [https://perma.cc/7X8X-UH8X]. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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 The SEC’s lack of commitment to, and the effects of Congress-
man Posey’s opposition efforts to, the 2010 Guidance are reflected 
in a February 2018 report by the Government Accountability Of-
fice.57 The report highlights multiple constraints that the SEC 
faces in reviewing climate-related disclosures. One constraint is 
that the SEC does not always have access to the information com-
panies use to support what they consider to be climate-related 
risks in their businesses and the information those companies rely 
on in determining materiality.58 Another constraint is that disclo-
sures vary in format and specificity.59 The report notes that the 
SEC has mechanisms, tools, and resources to help its staff consist-
ently review filing disclosures, including internal supervisory con-
trol testing, two-level review process, regulations and guidance, in-
ternal and external data, and staff training.60 However, with 
respect to internal supervisory control testing and staff training, 
senior staff members have neither conducted review specific to cli-
mate-related disclosures nor had training focused on the (1) mate-
riality of climate-related issues, (2) industry-specific climate-re-
lated disclosures, and (3) general climate-related disclosures.61 
With the SEC not committed to its interpretation in the 2010 
Guidance, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, in September 2010, 
sought to bring climate-related financial disclosures back to head-
lines by introducing the “Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018.”62 
The Act directed: 
 
57 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-188, CLIMATE-
RELATED RISKS: SEC HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
(2018) [hereinafter CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS]. The GAO released an-
other report in March 2019, discussing a lack of leadership from the White House 
on managing climate risks, the need for the federal government to develop a com-
prehensive plan to manage climate change, and that information on climate risks 
is urgently needed. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK 
SERIES: SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-
RISK AREAS 110–22 (2019). 
58 CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 57, at 16–17. 
59 Some companies report their climate-related disclosures in the business 
description section of its filing, while others may disclose a similar item in the 
risk factors section. This makes it difficult for SEC reviewers to compare compa-
nies within the same industry. Id. at 18–19. 
60 Id. at 20–24. 
61 Id. at 21, 23. 
62 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2018, S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018). 
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the SEC, in consultation with climate experts at other federal 
agencies, to issue rules within one year that require every public 
company to disclose: [i]ts direct and indirect greenhouse gas emis-
sions[;] [t]he total amount of fossil-fuel related assets that it owns 
or manages[;] [h]ow its valuation would be affected if climate 
change continues at its current pace or if policymakers success-
fully restrict greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Paris accord 
goal [;] [i]ts risk management strategies related to the physical 
risks and transition risks posed by climate change.63  
The Act also directed the SEC to create specific disclosure require-
ments for different industries, with additional disclosure require-
ments imposed on fossil fuel companies.64 Senator Warren’s bill did 
not get movement at the end of 2018, and died with the 115th Con-
gress.65 
 The Bill, however, was revived when Senator Warren reintro-
duced the bill to the 116th Congress as the “Climate Risk Disclo-
sure Act of 2019.”66 The latest action on this Bill occurred on July 
10, 2019, when it was referred to the Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs.67 U.S. Representative Sean Casten also in-
troduced a companion bill in the House.68 The latest action on the 
 
63 Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Colleagues Unveil Bill to Re-
quire Every Pub. Co. to Disclose Climate-Related Risks (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-colleagues-un-
veil-bill-to-require-every-public-company-to-disclose-climate-related-risks 
[https://perma.cc/5C2D-82V4]. 
64 Id. 
65 A bill becomes “dead” when it has not made it through the entire legislative 
process and signed into law by the end of the two-year Congressional cycle. Fre-
quently Asked Questions, OFF. OF THE CLERK, http://clerk.house.gov/legisla-
tive/legfaq.aspx, [https://perma.cc/42H8-6K3V] (referencing FAQ #11). The CRDA 
did not make it past its referral committee. See S. 3481, 115th Cong. (2018), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3481/ac-
tions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/YDX4-ZYPY] (providing tracking infor-
mation for the bill). 
66 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); Press 
Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator Warren, Representative Casten Lead Col-
leagues Introducing a Bill to Require Every Pub. Co. to Disclose Climate-Related 
Risks (July 10, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-re-
leases/senator-warren-representative-casten-lead-colleagues-introducing-a-bill-
to-require-every-public-company-to-disclose-climate-related-risks 
[https://perma.cc/G472-BUYA] [hereinafter Warren 2019 Press Release]. 
67 S. 2075, 116th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/2075/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/8T4Z-453V] (see link for bill 
tracking information). 
68 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, H.R. 3623, 116th Cong. (2019). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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companion bill occurred on July 16, 2019, when it was ordered to 
be reported (amended).69 The reintroduced Bill is substantively the 
same as the previous version.70 Despite this reintroduction, pas-
sage of a progressive climate bill is a long shot under the current 
political gridlock, although Republicans who once doubted climate 
change are now beginning to support mitigation efforts.71 
III. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
A. The Financial Impact of Climate Change 
Many organizations are aware of the traditional implications 
of climate change (i.e., extreme weather, sea level rise, drought, 
and property damage) but incorrectly perceive these as long-term 
implications rather than relevant to present day decisions.72 World 
leaders recognized the catastrophic effects of climate change that 
could occur within this century when nearly 200 countries signed 
the Paris Agreement in December 2015, agreeing to reduce green-
house gas emissions and to accelerate the transition to a lower-
carbon economy.73 Parties to the Paris Agreement agreed to hold 
the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels with a goal to limit the increase to 1.5 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.74 Although the U.S. be-
gan the process to withdraw from the Paris Agreement,75 no other 
 
69 See H.R. 3623, 116th Cong., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-con-
gress/house-bill/3623 [https://perma.cc/UZ6M-QYZC] (providing tracking infor-
mation for the bill).  
70 Compare S. 2075, 116th Cong., with S. 3481, 115th Cong. 
71 Arian Campo-Flores, Some Republican Lawmakers Break With Party on 
Climate Change, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-
republican-lawmakers-break-with-party-on-climate-change-11560337010 
[https://perma.cc/G2CV-3CT5].  
72 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at ii. 
73 Id. at 1. 
74 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 12, 2015 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. 
75 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-
the-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/Z4EJ-HEQT]; see also Climate Change: 
China Vows to Defend Paris Agreement, BBC (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-39861589 [https://perma.cc/WK7U-
262Q]. 
13
  
428	 PACE	ENVIRONMENTAL	LAW	REVIEW	 [Vol.	37	
countries have withdrawn, and those countries continue to express 
their support of adhering to the 2 degrees Celsius Scenario and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.76 Despite this extraordinary 
agreement, the IPCC issued a new report in October 2018, finding 
that, at current greenhouse gas emission rates, warming of 1.5 de-
grees Celsius above pre-industrial levels will occur between 2030 
and 2052.77 The report determined that the world economy will 
have to transform within just a few years to avoid the most serious 
damage, which they estimate would cost $54 trillion.78 
Following the IPCC report, in November 2018, the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program released a report highlighting the eco-
nomic damage that the U.S. is vulnerable to by the end of this cen-
tury because of the impacts of climate change.79 The report focuses 
on detrimental impacts to numerous sectors, including: (1) commu-
nities, (2) the economy, (3) water quality and availability, (4) 
health, (5) indigenous peoples, (6) ecosystems and ecosystem ser-
vices, (7) agriculture, (8) infrastructure, (9) oceans and coasts, and 
(10) tourism and recreation.80 The report also states that without 
substantial efforts to combat climate change, America’s economic 
growth will be hindered.81 There will be disruptions to labor 
productivity, power generation (through reduced generation effi-
ciency and increased energy demand), and overseas operations and 
 
76 Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Op-
posed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/cli-
mate/syria-joins-paris-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/BH2G-JD96]; Macron 
Defends Iran Deal, Paris Climate Accord at UN General Assembly, FRANCE 24 
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.france24.com/en/20170919-french-president-mac-
ron-response-trump-un-general-assembly-iran-deal-climate 
[https://perma.cc/56DM-QCHZ] (noting that Macron refuses to renegotiate the 
Paris Agreement). But see Emily Schultheis, German Parties Agree to Drop 2020 
Climate Goal: Report, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/re-
port-german-parties-agree-to-drop-2020-climate-goal/ [https://perma.cc/ZYS3-
4GM2]. 
77 IPCC REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
78 Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis 
as Early as 2040, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html 
[https://perma.cc/A7K7-A564]. 
79 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 
VOLUME II: IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Reidmiller, 
D.R. et al. eds., 2018). 
80 Id. at 25–32. 
81 Id. at 25. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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supply chains.82 Losses in some economic sectors are projected to 
reach hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century.83 
Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock—the world’s largest 
money-management firm84—in his 2020 annual letter to CEOs, 
simply stated how climate risk will impact the global system that 
finances economic growth: 
Will cities, for example, be able to afford their infrastructure needs 
as climate risk reshapes the market for municipal bonds? What 
will happen to the 30-year mortgage – a key building block of fi-
nance – if lenders can’t estimate the impact of climate risk over 
such a long timeline, and if there is no viable market for flood or 
fire insurance in impacted areas? What happens to inflation, and 
in turn interest rates, if the cost of food climbs from drought and 
flooding? How can we model economic growth if emerging markets 
see their productivity decline due to extreme heat and other cli-
mate impacts?85 
 Although climate change and the transition to a low-carbon 
economy pose significant financial risks, there are also opportuni-
ties that are relevant both near-term and in the future.86 As the 
world transitions away from fossil fuels and its related physical 
assets, there is a significant risk to organizations not prepared to 
handle such a change.87 New opportunities will arise from this 
transition because of the annual $1 trillion worth of investments it 
is expected to require for the foreseeable future.88 Those organiza-
tions focused on climate change mitigation and adaptation 
 
82 Id. at 25–26. 
83 Id. at 26. 
84 In 2019, Blackrock was the world’s largest asset manager with $6.52 tril-
lion in AUM. See M. Szmigiera, Largest Asset Management Companies Worldwide 
as of March 2019, by Managed Assets, STATISTA (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/431790/leading-asset-management-companies-worldwide-by-
assets/ [https://perma.cc/DAZ8-J33G]. At the beginning of 2020, BlackRock has 
increased its total assets under management to $7.4 trillion AUM. Blackrock Inc., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 16, 2020). 
85 Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8. 
86 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at ii. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL 
BRIEFING FOR COP21 4 (2015)). 
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solutions are presented with significant opportunities for invest-
ments.89 
B. The Role of Institutional Investors in the Shift to a 
Low-Carbon Economy 
Although government has the most important role to play in 
the transition, investors also have a very important role.90 Increas-
ingly, investor groups have become vocal about the financial im-
pacts of climate change as they begin to realize the seriousness of 
the situation. In December 2018, a group of 415 investors oversee-
ing $32 trillion in assets signed a letter asking governments to 
make changes that could slow further climate change.91 The group 
believes that climate change will cause permanent economic dam-
age that is up to four times the scale of the impacts of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis.92  
With this growing awareness of the significant economic im-
pact of climate change, banks have begun to change their lending 
practices. For example, five international banks have vowed to 
align their corporate lending practices with the Paris Agreement’s 
2 degrees Celsius goal and have taken steps to lessen their expo-
sure to financial losses caused by climate change.93 Institutional 
investors, utilizing the power of the capital they control, can assist 
in the transition to a low-carbon economy by investing in renewa-
ble energy projects, as well as divesting from fossil fuel projects. 
For example, HSBC pledged to invest $329 million into renewable 
 
89 Id.; see also Alice Ross, Tackling Climate Change – an Investor’s Guide, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa7a4400-d940-11e9-8f9b-
77216ebe1f17 [https://perma.cc/A9E5-6K4W]. 
90 See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8. 
91 See generally IIGCC, 2018 GLOB. INV’R STATEMENT TO GOV’TS ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2018), https://www.iigcc.org/download/global-investor-statement-to-gov-
ernments-on-climate-change/?wpdmdl=1826&re-
fresh=5eab3c6ea63c11588280430 [https://perma.cc/N73T-S4DG]. 
92 At COP24: Group of 415 Investors Call on World Leaders to Address Cli-
mate Change, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.unepfi.org/news/industries/investment/the-largest-ever-investor-
statement-to-governments/ [https://perma.cc/5U45-DKBV]. 
93 Banks Join ING in Aligning Loan Portfolios to Fight Climate Change, ING 
WHOLESALE BANKING, https://www.ingwb.com/insights/news/2018/banks-join-ing-
in-aligning-loan-portfolios-to-fight-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7H48-
PNYY]. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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energy infrastructure for wind and solar.94 Citigroup Inc. (“Citi”) 
has vowed to phase out support to the coal industry to accelerate 
the shift to a low-carbon economy.95 Additionally, the Dutch bank 
ING Group plans to analyze how a company’s efforts against cli-
mate change will impact its debt payment ability.96 The bank will 
also evaluate how companies perform and whether they are meet-
ing the targets of the Paris Agreement.97 
Banks have also begun to use various other mechanisms to ad-
dress climate change and sustainability. One mechanism is a green 
mortgage. Almost 40 European banks are testing this new type of 
mortgage under which borrowers are required to have their prop-
erties meet certain energy efficiency standards.98 Discounted mort-
gages will also be offered to customers who spend extra on new 
buildings or property upgrades that save power or natural gas 
costs.99 Another mechanism is “sustainable improvement loans,” 
which ING has been offering to companies.100 Companies receive a 
higher credit rating if targets are met.101 A third mechanism is 
green bonds, a mechanism which Citi will use to fund renewable 
energy and conservation efforts.102  
 
94 Jeremy Hodges, HSBC Pledges $329 Million Investment in British Green 
Energy, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.renewableener-
gyworld.com/2018/10/16/hsbc-pension-pledges-329-million-investment-in-green-
energy/#gref [https://perma.cc/G64G-SPNG]. 
95 Dan Ennis, Citi Pledges to Stop Thermal Coal-Mining Financing by 2030, 
BANKING DIVE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.bankingdive.com/news/citibank-
pledge-stop-thermal-coal-mining-financing/576451/ [https://perma.cc/C5HG-
K77E]. 
96 Emily Chasan, ING Eyes How Companies It Lends to Will Weather Climate 
Change, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Sept. 14, 2018), https://news.bloombergenviron-
ment.com/environment-and-energy/ing-eyeshowcompanies-it-lends-to-will-
weather-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6UYE-KJMG]. 
97 Id. 
98 Matthew Carr, Green Mortgages on Tap from Banks Funding Climate In-
vestment, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2018,), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2018-09-24/green-mortgages-on-tap-from-banks-funding-climate-investment 
[https://perma.cc/6BA6-CZWQ]. 
99 Id. 
100 Chasan, supra note 96. 
101 Id. 
102 Darcy Reddan, Citi Issues €1B Inaugural Green Bond to Fund Enviro 
Goals, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/environmental/arti-
cles/1120840/citi-issues-1b-inaugural-green-bond-to-fund-enviro-
goals?nl_pk=41832e84-4975-4bd1-af11-63f9f82f62b4&utm_source=newslet-
ter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=environmental. 
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Banks are also embarking on broader campaigns to combat cli-
mate change. For example, in 2015, Citi announced a $100 billion 
environmental finance goal over ten years to help accelerate the 
global transition to a low-carbon economy,103 but is planning to 
reach that goal four years early.104 Citi also became the first major 
U.S. bank to support the of United Nation Principles for Responsi-
ble Banking.105 In these principles, banks commit to strategically 
align their business with the goals of the Paris Agreement and the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.106 Banks collec-
tively worth $47 trillion in assets have already signed up.107 Lastly, 
in one of the most significant efforts so far, BlackRock announced 
at the beginning of 2020 that it would place sustainability at the 
center of its investment approach by exiting investments in ther-
mal coal producers and releasing disclosures aligned with the 
TCFD Recommendations.108 These examples demonstrate how fi-
nancial institutions can play a key role in the reallocation of capital 
to steer the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
 
103 Id. 
104 Jennifer Surane, Citi to Reach $100 Billion Environmental Goal Four 
Years Early, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2019-07-03/citi-to-reach-100-billion-environmental-goal-four-years-early 
[https://perma.cc/6NWA-Y5WH].  
105 Id.  
106 Banks Worth $47 Trillion Adopt New UN-backed Climate, Sustainability 
Principles, UN NEWS (Sept. 22, 2019), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1046982 [https://perma.cc/S5VS-Q4S4].  
107 Id. 
108 See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS BY 
THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD) 
A. What is the TCFD? 
 In April 2015, the Group of 20 (“G20”) Finance Ministers109 re-
quested that the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”)110 “convene 
public- and private-sector participants to review how the financial 
sector can take account of climate-related issues.”111 In December 
2015, the FSB responded by establishing the TCFD – chaired by 
Michael Bloomberg – to develop a voluntary climate-related disclo-
sure framework that those in the business and financial industry 
can use to better understand material risks.112 Through consulting 
with global leaders in business and finance, the TCFD was to cre-
ate recommendations that would assist companies’ understanding 
of what climate-related information is sought after by investors so 
companies can align their disclosures with those investor needs.113 
By December 2016, after soliciting input and comments from the 
public and from business and financial leaders, the TCFD released 
its Draft Report of the Recommendations.114 After the release of 
the Draft Report, the TCFD conducted another consultation to 
 
109 The G20 consists of the Finance Ministers (US equivalent: Secretary of 
the Treasury) and Central Bank Governors (US equivalent: Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve) from the twenty largest economies in the world who gather period-
ically to discuss financial and socioeconomic issues. About the G20, G20, 
https://g20.org/en/about/Pages/whatis.aspx [https://perma.cc/B8RM-7RAK]. 
110 “The [FSB] is an international body that monitors and makes recommen-
dations about the global financial system.” About the FSB, FSB, 
https://www.fsb.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/4GLQ-Y4C9]. 
111 G20, COMMUNIQUÉ – G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK 
GOVERNORS MEETING 5 (Apr. 16-17, 2015), http://www.g20.org.tr/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/04/April-G20-FMCBG-Communique-Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3K65-K9X5]. 
112 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at iii; see also About the Task 
Force, TCFD, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/# [https://perma.cc/SGF8-UPSC].  
113 About the Task Force, supra note 112. 
114 TCFD, DRAFT REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-
RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/12/16_1221_TCFD_Report_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB25-
W7GD]. 
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gather feedback on its initial recommendations.115 The TCFD re-
leased its Final Report in June 2017.116  
B. TCFD Recommendations 
 The TCFD created the Recommendations in a manner such 
that all organizations can align their financial disclosures with 
them and that they can provide organizations with decision-useful 
information relating to the financial risks and opportunities of the 
low-carbon transition.117 Although voluntary, the TCFD created 
the Recommendations to be “ambitious, but also practical for near-
term adoption,” and “expects that reporting of climate-related risks 
and opportunities will evolve over time as organizations, investors, 
and others contribute to the quality and consistency of the infor-
mation disclosed.”118  
The TCFD Recommendations address four core elements of cli-
mate-related financial disclosures: (1) governance (“[t]he organiza-
tion’s governance around climate-related risks and opportunities”); 
(2) strategy (“[t]he actual and potential impacts of climate-related 
risks and opportunities on the organization’s businesses, strategy, 
and financial planning”); (3) risk management (“[t]he processes 
used by the organization to identify, assess, and manage climate-
related risks”); and (4) metrics and targets (“[t]he metrics and tar-
gets used to assess and manage relevant climate-related risks and 
opportunities”).119 For purposes of analyzing climate-related risks 
under these elements, the Recommendations categorizes risks into 
transition risks120 and physical risks.121 When analyzing climate-
related opportunities, the opportunities are categorized into five 
types: resource efficiency, energy source, products and services, 
markets, and resilience.122 
 
115 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 48. 
116 Id. at i. 
117 Id. at iii fig.1. 
118 Id. at 3. 
119 Id. at iv–v fig.2. 
120 Transition risks include law, technology, market, and reputation. Id. at 10 
tbl.1. 
121 Physical risks include those classified as acute (“[i]ncreased severity of 
extreme weather events”) and chronic (rising temperatures and sea levels, ex-
treme weather pattern variability, and changes in precipitation patterns). Id. 
122 Id. at 11 tbl.2. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol37/iss2/4
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Aside from the four core elements, there are various other rec-
ommended guidelines. A main focus of the Recommendations, in 
order to foster broader use of climate-related financial disclosures, 
is to include them in annual public financial filings123 with adher-
ence to seven principles for effective disclosures.124 In addition to 
adhering to the seven principles, the Task Force also recommends 
that companies implement scenario analysis125 to test the resili-
ence of an organization’s strategy against different climate-related 
scenarios.126 Lastly, the TCFD also provides supplemental guid-
ance to the financial sector127 and to the non-financial sector.128  
According to the TCFD 2019 Status Update, the TCFD Recom-
mendations have gained support from various governments, nu-
merous multinational corporations, financial institutions, account-
ing boards, insurance companies, and pension funds.129 As of 
December 2019, 930 organizations have expressed their support 
for the TCFD Recommendations,130 including fourteen of the 
world’s top fifteen largest institutional investors.131 Ernst & Young 
(“EY”) created a guide for businesses on how to implement the 
TCFD Recommendations and found there are benefits to both 
 
123 Id. at iv. 
124 Disclosures should be representative of relevant information; specific and 
complete; clear, balanced, and understandable; consistent over time; comparable 
among companies within a sector, industry, or portfolio; reliable, verifiable, and 
objective; provided on a timely basis; and should represent relevant information. 
Id. at 18 fig.6. 
125 Scenario analysis is a useful tool for considering effects on future perfor-
mance because it is a process that analyzes alternative possible future outcomes. 
GLOB. INV’R COAL. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS OF OIL AND GAS 
COMPANIES: TRANSITION TO A LOWER CARBON FUTURE 6 (2016), 
http://www.iigcc.org/files/publication-
files/IIGCC_2016_Oil_and_Gas_report_v17_WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/UG2Y-
8E35]. Scenario analysis is also intended to be used as a “business tool to stress 
test the resilience of a company’s strategy and portfolio.” AHMAD, supra note 41, 
at 18.  
126 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at v. 
127 The financial sector includes banks, insurance companies, asset owners, 
and asset managers. Id. at 15. 
128 The non-financial sector includes energy; transportation; materials and 
buildings; and agriculture, food, and forest products. Id. 
129 See 2019 STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 110–16. 
130 TCFD Supporters, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, 
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/R7A6-H6HH] [herein-
after TCFD Supporters]. 
131 Szmigiera, supra note 84 (listing largest asset management companies); 
see also TCFD Supporters, supra note 130.  
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investors and businesses who opt do so.132 These benefits include 
improved risk management; familiarization with scenario analy-
sis; consistent external communication; a shift of focus of external 
stakeholders towards forward looking assumptions, methodolo-
gies, opportunities, and strategies; as well as an increased aware-
ness of directors’ fiduciary duty,133 which the Business Roundtable 
recently stated applies to all stakeholders.134  
V. WHY CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURES HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL 
THUS FAR 
 A primary reason why the 2010 Climate Guidance failed to 
make a significant impact on climate-related financial disclosures 
is because the guidance is an interpretive rule rather than a legis-
lative rule. Interpretive rules, a type of “guidance document” that 
does not go through notice and comment rulemaking,135 “do not 
have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight 
in the adjudicatory process.”136 Guidance documents include inter-
pretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of agency or-
ganization, procedure, or practice.137 Interpretive rules are merely 
an agency’s present interpretation of a statue and have no “power 
to control,”138 and an “agency remains free in any particular case 
to diverge from whatever outcome the policy statement or interpre-
tive rule might suggest.”139 A legislative rule, on the other hand, is 
binding policy, created through rulemaking that constitutes 
 
132 EY, REPORTING CLIMATE CHANGE RISK 11 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Pub-
lication/vwLUAssets/ey-at-reporting-climate-change-risk-2017/$FILE/ey-
reporting-climate-change-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z84C-S5UZ]. 
133 Id. 
134 See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Pro-
mote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-
of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans 
[https://perma.cc/GG83-Q4A6]. 
135 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). 
136 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015) (quoting Shalala 
v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)). 
137 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Ana-
lyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 788 (2010). 
138 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
139 Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy, 843 F.2d 528, 537 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
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binding precedent and carries the force of law.140 The Second Cir-
cuit, in White v. Shalala, found that legislative rules are those that 
create laws, rights, or duties, whereas interpretive rules are those 
that clarify an existing statute or regulation.141 Although the SEC 
interpreted that current securities laws require material risks 
posed by climate change to be disclosed, the fact that it is an inter-
pretive rule provides the SEC with the ability to diverge from and 
not enforce its interpretation and leaves significant discretion to 
management.  
Despite the SEC not enforcing its interpretation, climate skep-
tics and industry advocates may argue that the 2010 Climate Guid-
ance is really a legislative rule disguised as an interpretive rule – 
hoping to entirely eliminate the “rule” for failure to go through no-
tice and comment rulemaking– but that argument would most 
likely fail.142 “[A] rule has such force only if Congress has delegated 
legislative power to the agency and if the agency intended to exer-
cise that power in promulgating the rule.”143 American Mining 
Congress v. Mine Safety and Health Administration provided three 
instances where intent to exercise can be found, but these are also 
red flags that a legislative rule is disguised as an interpretive rule: 
(1) whether, in the absence of a legislative rule, the basis for agency 
enforcement would be inadequate; (2) whether it was published in 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR); and (3) where an amend-
ment conflicts with a legislative rule, the amendment must be leg-
islative.144 The second instance, publication in the CFR, was 
deemed to be not determinative alone by Health Insurance Associ-
ation of America, Inc. v. Shalala.145 However, American Mining 
Congress did not address whether the absence of a red flag is suf-
ficient to show that a rule is not legislative.  
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P. helped fill 
this void.146 Paralyzed Veterans stated that a rule is more likely to 
 
140 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
141 White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303–04 (2d Cir. 1993). 
142 See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
143 Id. at 1109. 
144 Id. 
145 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
146 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997), abrogated by Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
575 U.S. 92 (2015). This case was abrogated on the grounds that, “[b]ecause an 
agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial 
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be an interpretive rule and therefore exempt from notice and com-
ment rulemaking if its content: (1) is fairly encompassed within the 
preexisting statute or legislative rule that it purports to construe; 
(2) it is tightly drawn linguistically from the actual language of the 
preexisting rule; or (3) is not distinct or additive to the preexisting 
regulation or statute.147 Typically, the more tethered the interpre-
tive rule is to the language of the statute or legislative rule, the 
more likely the rule is an interpretation. 
In considering the 2010 Climate Guidance, neither red flag is 
raised. For the first red flag, Regulation S-K is the implementing 
regulation, and the guidance document is interpreting Regulation 
S-K. Without Regulation S-K, the SEC would not have an adequate 
basis for enforcing the Guidance. For the second red flag, the 2010 
Guidance is not an amendment to Regulation S-K and does not 
purport to be an amendment. Filling in the American Mining Con-
gress gaps with the factors from Paralyzed Veterans, it is quite 
clear that the Guidance is an interpretive rule rather than a legis-
lative rule. For the question of whether the content is “fairly en-
compassed” within Regulation S-K, the Guidance discusses what 
Items of Regulations S-K may trigger disclosure of climate change-
related information in order to satisfy an issuers obligation to dis-
close “such further material information, if any, as may be neces-
sary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading.”148 This is “fairly en-
compassed” because the SEC is simply spelling out that issuers 
have a duty to disclose climate-change information if it is deemed 
material and that failure to disclose such information would make 
the disclosure misleading. The second factor of the analysis is also 
satisfied. After the Guidance explains what Items may trigger dis-
closure obligations,149 it then discusses how those Items can be ap-
plied to climate change-related issues.150 The applications are 
 
interpretive rule, it is also not required to use those procedures when it amends 
or repeals that interpretive rule.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 101. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act do not mandate that rule chal-
lenges be filed in the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court has infamously never 
addressed the issue of whether a legislative rule can be disguised as an interpre-
tive rule. Therefore, the Paralyzed Veterans analysis is not nationally binding on 
challenges to SEC rules. 
147 Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588. 
148 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20 (2020). 
149 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 12–20. 
150 Id. at 22–27. 
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“tightly drawn linguistically” because the Guidance is applying the 
climate change-related issues to the specific language and purpose 
of the Items. For example, Item 503(c) requires an issuer to disclose 
non-generic risk factors which the Guidance then states could in-
clude pending litigation or legislation pertaining to climate 
change.151 Lastly, the Guidance is not distinct or additive to Regu-
lation S-K; rather, it finds that climate risks “could” or “may” trig-
ger disclosure obligations, and that companies “should consider” 
disclosing material risks.152 Because the 2010 Climate Guidance 
cannot be seen as a legislative rule, it therefore provides no binding 
effect on the SEC nor the regulated entities; it is simply the SEC’s 
interpretation of existing disclosure obligations as it relates to ma-
terial climate-related information. 
VI. RECOMMENDATION: IMPROVED 
LEGISLATION REQUIRING MANDATORY 
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURES ALIGNED WITH THE TCFD 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This Note suggests that passing an amended version of the 
CRDA, requiring alignment with the TCFD Recommendations, 
will hasten the U.S. path to a low-carbon economy. As a world 
leader, the U.S. must lead by example and work with other G20 
countries to adhere to the targets of the Paris Agreement. As seen 
with the Kyoto Protocol, where other countries like the European 
Union would only agree to an emissions trading system if the U.S. 
would agree to join,153 the U.S. has an opportunity to make man-
datory climate risk disclosure mainstream among developed na-
tions. With global support of the Recommendations, the U.S., by 
creating a mandatory reporting framework aligned with the TCFD 
Recommendations, will encourage other countries to adopt the 
same or substantially similar frameworks. With global uniformity 
in the availability of information pertaining to climate-related 
risks, investors will have the necessary information to make 
 
151 Id. at 22. 
152 See General Electric Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 381–85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(discussing that non-mandatory language can help determine if a rule is interpre-
tive rather than legislative). 
153 See MICHAEL BLOWFIELD, BUSINESS AND SUSTAINABILITY 139 (2013). 
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informed investments, allowing the global economy to transition to 
a low-carbon economy faster. 
A mandatory scheme is needed because voluntary frame-
works, like those offered by the Sustainability Accounting Stand-
ards Board, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, and the International Integrated Reporting 
Council, have not been adopted and implemented fast enough.154 
The window to adopt and implement these frameworks is closing 
quickly, but the implementation must occur in order to minimize 
the financial risks from climate change.155 Many companies al-
ready disclose sustainability issues in voluntary reports, but have 
been hesitant to disclose them in mandatory reports because of 
their perceived litigation risk.156 Information in official filings are 
of more use because the information “gets greater scrutiny, is sub-
ject to better internal controls and procedures, in reality poses no 
legal risk,157 and is more credible to investors.”158 The litigation 
risk that companies are concerned about pertains to scenario anal-
ysis being interpreted as a financial forecast; however, it is im-
portant for companies to understand that the TCFD is asking com-
panies to “explain how their business might be affected under 
different scenarios” rather than provide a financial forecast.159 A 
mandatory framework should ease these concerns by requiring all 
issuers to use scenario analysis for hypothetical futures. 
A. New Legislation is Needed Rather than a New 
 
154 2019 STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at i (“[P]rogress must be accelerated. 
Today’s disclosures remain far from the scale markets need to channel investment 
to sustainable and resilient solutions, opportunities, and business models.”). 
155 BANK OF ENGLAND, TRANSITION IN THINKING: THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE ON THE UK BANKING SECTOR 9 (2018), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/report/transition-in-thinking-the-impact-
of-climate-change-on-the-uk-banking-sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9GA-GWQK]. 
156 Robert G. Eccles & Michael P. Krzus, Why Companies Should Report Fi-
nancial Risks From Climate Change, 59 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (2018), 
http://ilp.mit.edu/media/news_articles/smr/2018/59312.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/98AH-NQN9]. 
157 It is logical that companies would be subject to litigation risk by not in-
cluding this relevant information in official reports rather than in voluntary re-
ports because they would be subject to the litigation risk of failing to disclose ma-
terial issues and misleading investors.  
158 Eccles & Krzus, supra note 156. 
159 Id. 
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Regulation 
Climate change is an extraordinary issue that requires bold 
solutions. The solutions used to combat it must be used long 
enough to promote meaningful change. A law requiring mandatory 
climate-related financial disclosures is one such solution. Although 
both congressional legislation and agency regulation carry the 
force of law,160 congressional legislation is preferred. A regulation 
for an issue of this importance is not as beneficial because of po-
tential presidential influence cast upon the promulgation process. 
Because the question of whether the SEC is truly an independent 
agency has not been answered,161 it is a safer option to avoid the 
uncertainty of presidential influence by enacting legislation rather 
than a regulation. 
Since the issuance of Executive Order 12,291,162 regulations 
have been plagued with questionable presidential influence.163 
This Executive Order required agencies to follow a set of policy 
goals and mandates when proposing new regulations, which are 
then reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”) prior to publication.164 Although it was later revoked by 
Executive Order 12,866,165 its basic principles are still reflected in 
the executive review process today.166 OIRA is tasked with ensur-
ing that agency actions are consistent presidential policies and pri-
orities.167 The intent of the review program was to restore integrity, 
legitimacy, and transparency to the regulatory decision-making 
process.168 Despite these efforts, the program has yet to achieve 
these goals and is plagued by delays of agency actions, 
 
160 See “force of law discussion” supra Part V. 
161 See supra note 12 for a discussion on the issue of SEC independence. 
162 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
app. at 472–76 (1988), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), 
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2018). 
163 Peter Ketcham-Colwill, Presidential Influence Over Agency Rulemaking 
Through Regulatory Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2014). 
164 Id. at 1623–24. 
165 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 822–27 (2018). 
166 Ketcham-Colwill, supra note 163, at 1624. 
167 Id. 
168 Exec. Order No. 12,866, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 638.  
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circumvention of disclosure and transparency requirements, and, 
because of this circumvention, a lack of accountability.169  
 This influence has already been seen by the lack of SEC en-
forcement and the halted review of the Concept Release on Busi-
ness and Financial Disclosures Required by Regulation S-K.170 To 
limit presidential influence and to avoid many of these executive 
hurdles, legislation should be the vehicle used to introduce a law 
requiring climate-related financial disclosures. Congressional leg-
islation can require the SEC to promulgate more stringent regula-
tions, therefore limiting the amount of presidential influence on 
the regulatory review process.  
B. Required Changes to the Climate Risk Disclosure 
Act of 2019 
 As with most congressional legislation, the CRDA is vague, 
providing the SEC with too much discretion when promulgating 
regulations under the specified criteria and also leaving the SEC 
vulnerable to influence by whomever is the head of the executive 
branch. The CRDA is a step in the right direction, but it does not 
require enough disclosure and does not set forth a uniform frame-
work that provides investors with a full spectrum of quality infor-
mation that will allow investors to make the profitable and neces-
sary investments required for a swift transition to a low-carbon 
economy. Without uniform standards, enforcement becomes more 
difficult, causing companies to incur greater indirect costs like 
maintaining separate record-keeping requirements for each juris-
diction they operate in.171 The new bill should require alignment 
with the TCFD Recommendations to promote global uniformity in 
disclosure requirements.  
Appendix B of this Note lists where the CRDA is aligned with 
the Recommendations (Appendix A provides a table that lists the 
parts of the TCFD’s four core recommendation categories). Risk 
Management is the only core recommendation category that the 
CRDA aligns with; the CRDA fails to fully align with the other 
three core recommendation categories. To start, the subsection of 
 
169 See Ketcham-Colwill, supra note 163, at 1626–33. 
170 Nowiski, supra note 52, at 7–8; see also Gelles, supra note 6. 
171 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki & Katherine Fielder, The Neoliberal Turn in 
Environmental Regulation, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 1, 40 (2016) (discussing the costs 
associated with non-uniform eco-labels). 
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the CRDA that discusses corporate governance only requires dis-
closure of the company’s practices surrounding climate-related 
risks.172 To fully align with the Governance category of the Recom-
mendations, the phrase “and opportunities” should be added to the 
end of the sentence. The CRDA should also include language that 
explicitly requires a discussion of the board’s oversight and man-
agement’s role in the corporate governance process pertaining to 
climate-related risks and opportunities. 
Next, the CRDA is not fully aligned with parts A and B of the 
Recommendation’s Strategy category. Part A is not satisfied be-
cause the Act fails to require companies to “[d]escribe the climate-
related risks and opportunities the organization has identified over 
the short, medium, and long term.”173 A similar requirement 
should be added. Part B is only partially satisfied because the Act 
only requires companies to identify and evaluate the financial im-
pact of climate-related risks.174 In order to fully align with the 
Strategy category, the Act must also include the identification and 
evaluation of the financial impact of climate-related opportunities. 
Lastly, the CRDA is only partially aligned with the Metrics 
and Targets category of the Recommendations. Part B is only par-
tially satisfied because, although the Act requires the disclosure of 
direct and indirect GHG emissions, it does not specifically require 
the use of the GHG Protocol.175 Use of the GHG Protocol should be 
used to fully align with the Recommendations and also further pro-
mote the use of a standard framework. Part C is not satisfied be-
cause language must be added to require the issuer to discuss its 
metrics and targets for factors like GHG emissions, water use, and 
energy use. 
 The most important piece missing from the CRDA is the 
identification of opportunities a company has during the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. The current text of the CRDA only 
 
172 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. § 5(a) (2019) 
(adding Section (s)(2)(B) as a proposed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018)). 
173 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 14. 
174 S. 2075 § 5(a) (Section (s)(2)(a) of the proposed amendment to § 78m). 
175 The GHG Protocol is a standardized corporate GHG accounting and re-
porting framework that termed Scope 1, 2, and 3 GHG emissions. See generally A 
CORPORATE AND REPORTING STANDARD, THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL (2004), 
https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MW72-NR94]. 
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mentions the word “opportunity” three times: once in the “Sense of 
Congress” section, and twice in the “Findings” section, where the 
language is qualified by the non-mandatory language “should.”176 
No mention of opportunity is made in the two subsequent sections: 
“Disclosures Relating to Climate Change” and “Rulemaking.”177 
Opportunities are needed for full disclosure. The purpose of 
climate risk disclosure is to assist in the swift transition to a low-
carbon economy and to provide investors with accurate infor-
mation about the assets they are investing in. When making an 
investment decision in the future low-carbon economy, knowing 
what opportunities exist for a company is essential information for 
an investor.178 Mercer indicates in its 2019 report that its clients 
want to know how the market prices climate opportunities.179  
The sole disclosure of risks solves only the first half of the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy: divestment from fossil fuels. The 
second half requires investment in renewables so that the technol-
ogy and infrastructure needed for the low-carbon economy is per-
fected and in place. Thus, it is necessary for opportunities to be 
disclosed by companies as well. Because the transition to a low-
carbon economy is inevitable,180 disclosure of climate-related op-
portunities will shift green investments away from stereotypical 
activist investors, sustainable investors, socially responsible inves-
tors, etc., and towards mainstream investment. Mercer identifies 
investment in to the 2 degrees Celsius Scenario as both an eco-
nomic imperative and an opportunity.181 Investors who become op-
portunistic “can target investment in the many mitigation and ad-
aptation solutions required for a transformative transition.”182 
Therefore, the disclosure of these opportunities is necessary to cap-
ture investors who have not traditionally made green investments. 
 
176 S. 2075 §§ 3(7), 4(1)–(2)(C). 
177 Id. §§ 5, 6. 
178 See MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2019), 
https://www.mercer.com/content/dam/ 
mercer/attachments/private/nurture-cycle/gl-2019-wealth-climate-change-the-se-
quel-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NLM-RHPU]. 
179 Id. at 9.  
180 Helen Mountford, Can Low-Carbon Investments Help Economies Recover 
from Coronavirus?, WORLD ECONOMIC F. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.wefo-
rum.org/agenda/2020/03/coronavirus-low-carbon-investments-economies-recov-
ery-climate-change [https://perma.cc/UFP9-U8JC]. 
181 MERCER, supra note 178, at 11. 
182 Id. at 12. 
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VII. ALTERNATIVES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 Although this Note recommends that new legislation be 
passed, it is not necessarily the most feasible option because of the 
difficulty in passing legislation, especially in today’s increasingly 
polarized political climate. Alternatives within administrative law 
exist that are more feasible in the short term. However, these op-
tions may not be feasible during the current Trump Administration 
because of its pro-industry approach to environmental regula-
tion.183 
A. Use a More Forceful Interpretation of the Current 
Law to Create a New Interpretive Rule 
 Although the 2010 Climate Guidance stated that disclosure of 
material climate-related information is already required under 
current securities law, the Guidance was not as forceful as it could 
have been. Because the Guidance consistently uses the terms 
“could,” “may,” and “should consider,” a significant amount of dis-
cretion is left to management in determining what climate-related 
issues must be disclosed. In order to “remind parties of their exist-
ing duties,” the SEC can provide substantially more clarification 
on what climate-related information is material and how it should 
be disclosed. 
A more forceful interpretation of Regulation S-K is required. 
The 2010 Guidance only addresses four areas of Regulation S-K 
where climate risk disclosure could be triggered: Item 101, “De-
scription of Business”; Item 103, “Legal Proceedings”; Item 303, 
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis”; and Item 503(c), “Risk 
Factors.”184 Other Items of Regulation S-K trigger disclosure re-
quirements if a more forceful interpretation is used. For example, 
Item 102, “Description of Property,” requires a registrant to 
“[s]tate briefly the location and general character of the principal 
plants and other materially important physical properties of the 
 
183 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 03, 2017) (“[I]t 
is important that for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regula-
tions be identified for elimination.”); see also Eric Lipton et al., The Real-Life Ef-
fects of Trump’s Environmental Rollbacks: 5 Takeaways from Our Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/us/trump-envi-
ronment-regulation-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/8CMB-ESEB]. 
184 2010 CLIMATE GUIDANCE, supra note 13, at 12–20. 
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registrant and its subsidiaries.”185 Climate related disclosures un-
der this Item include the vulnerability of a company’s property to 
sea level rise or water scarcity, and also include the opportunity 
for investments in adaptation and mitigation infrastructure. Item 
304, “Changes in and Disagreements with Accountants on Ac-
counting and Financial Disclosures,” requires the disclosure of, in-
ter alia, disagreements between the registrant and the former ac-
countant over the scope of financial statement disclosure.186 
Climate-related disclosures are triggered if the former accountant 
believed that the scope or fairness of the financial statement pro-
vided by management did not, based on the information available 
to the accountant, account for all of the financial risks the company 
is exposed to due to climate change.187 Item 305, “Quantitative and 
Qualitative Disclosure of Market Risk,”188 triggers disclosure if the 
market for oil and gas is disrupted. This Item also requires disclo-
sure of how the company manages that market risk exposure (i.e., 
what are its objectives and general strategies).189 Item 308, “Inter-
nal Controls Over Financial Reporting,” requires management to 
disclose the framework used for evaluating the effectiveness of its 
internal controls over financial reporting, and the registrant can-
not conclude that the controls are effective if “there are one or more 
material weaknesses in the registrant’s internal control over finan-
cial reporting.”190 Almost all companies cannot conclude that their 
internal controls over financial reporting are effective if they are 
not reporting climate-related risks and opportunities or are only 
providing vague or overly broad statements because these issues 
are material. 
A more forceful interpretation, then translated into a new in-
terpretive rule, can more clearly and appropriately clarify and re-
mind issuers of their duties under current securities law as it re-
lates to material climate-related information. The SEC providing 
a new interpretive rule is the quickest administrative action that 
can be taken because it would not have to go through notice and 
 
185 17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2020). 
186 Id. § 229.304(a)(1)(iv). 
187 See id. § 229.304(a)(1)(v). 
188 Id. § 229.305. 
189 See id. § 229.305(b)(ii). 
190 Id. § 229.308(a)(3). 
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comment rulemaking.191 A new interpretation is appropriate for 
two reasons: (1) global knowledge on climate science has signifi-
cantly increased since 2010, and (2) management would have less 
discretion when determining which climate-related impacts on 
their company are material. New data about climate change is un-
covered every day. The National Academy of Sciences, Engineer-
ing, and Medicine released a report in 2016 that defines the study 
of climate change and its effect on an individual weather or climate 
event as “event attribution.” The report states that “more and more 
event attribution studies are being published every year,”192 and 
this in part due to “the potential value of attribution for informing 
choices about assessing and managing risk in guiding climate ad-
aptation strategies.”193 A new interpretation that reflects the abun-
dance of science discovered since 2010 will provide management 
with the guidance they need for determining what information is 
material, and thus disclosed, as to not be misleading to investors. 
Although an interpretive rule is the weakest solution because it is 
not binding law, it will still provide management with less discre-
tion in determining what is material.194 An interpretive rule “re-
minds affected parties of existing duties,”195 so management will 
have less grounds to argue that the information they failed to dis-
close was not material. 
A more forceful interpretation, however, may run in to legal 
concerns related to administrative law, primarily issues of defer-
ence. The Auer doctrine,196 recently upheld but limited in the pro-
cess by Kisor v. Wilkie,197 instructs a court to defer to an agency’s 
 
191 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). 
192 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE, COMMITTEE 
ON EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE ATTRIBUTION, ATTRIBUTION 
OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2016). 
193 Id. at 1. 
194 An important comparison to note here is that a new interpretive rule 
would limit management’s discretion, not the SEC’s enforcement discretion, so the 
interpretive rule would not create a binding effect that would thereby classify the 
rule as legislative. Cf. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (finding that a rule limiting enforcement discretion is deemed a legislative 
rule rather than interpretive). 
195 General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(citation omitted). 
196 Prior to its limitation, the Auer doctrine afforded deference to an agency’s 
interpretation unless that interpretation was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
197 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
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interpretation of its own regulation after certain factors have been 
met. First, “a court should not afford Auer deference unless the 
regulation is genuinely ambiguous,” determined by exhausting all 
the traditional tools of construction.198 Second, “[i]f genuine ambi-
guity remains . . . the agency’s reading must still be ‘reasonable.’”199 
Third, the “court must make an independent inquiry into whether 
the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to 
controlling weight.”200 This is satisfied if the interpretation is made 
as the agency’s “authoritative” or “official position” (i.e., made by 
the head of the agency or the head’s chief advisors rather than a 
mid-level official).201 Next, “the agency’s interpretation must in 
some way implicate its substantive expertise.”202 Lastly, “an 
agency’s reading of the rule must reflect ‘fair and considered judg-
ment’ to receive Auer deference.”203 This means that it cannot be a 
“convenient litigating position,” be a “post hoc rationalization ad-
vanced to defend past agency action,” or create “unfair surprise” to 
regulated parties.204 
On its face, a more forceful interpretation would have diffi-
culty surviving the first factor. Is the term “material” genuinely 
ambiguous after a court exhausts all traditional tools of construc-
tion? It is hard to say; the term “material” is vague, as well as the 
term “reasonable investor” used in the Supreme Court’s and SEC’s 
definitions.205 “The ‘reasonable investor’ is at best a shadowy fig-
ure, described only generically in judicial opinions and—in doc-
trine if not in practice—someone for the fact-finder to identify case-
by-case.”206 Assuming, arguendo, that a court finds that the regu-
lation is genuinely ambiguous, the new interpretation should have 
no trouble passing the remaining four factors. The new interpreta-
tion is “reasonable” because it serves the purpose of protecting 
 
198 Id. at 2415. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 2416. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 2417. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 2417–18 (internal quotations omitted). 
205 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). 
206 Amanda Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 13, 2016), https://corpgov.law.har-
vard.edu/2016/10/13/the-reasonable-investor-of-federal-securities-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QLH-NHQS]. 
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investors and falls in line with market trends and the approach of 
other financial regulators around the world. The third factor is sat-
isfied because this alternative will be issued as a new interpretive 
rule, such that it is “authoritative” and the “official position” of the 
SEC. A new interpretive rule may encounter some trouble when 
applied to the “substantive experience” factor. On the one hand, a 
more forceful interpretation may face challenges that, because the 
SEC does not have the technical expertise to address issues of cli-
mate change, they should not be able to make such determinations. 
Challengers may argue that the SEC, as an agency that deals with 
securities and investor protection, is not the appropriate agency to 
address issues of climate change. On the other hand, the SEC is an 
agency that analyzes financial risks. Analyzing a climate-related 
risk is just like analyzing the other risks that fall on the desks of 
SEC staff, and, as Larry Fink said in his 2020 annual letter to 
CEOs, “climate risk is investment risk.”207 The latter view lends 
support that a new interpretive rule with a more forceful interpre-
tation of Regulation S-K would be given Auer deference by a re-
viewing court. Lastly, this is not a “convenient litigating position” 
or “post hoc rationalization advanced to defend past agency action” 
because it is not in response to litigation or an agency action. It 
also does not catch regulated parties off guard because the market 
is clearly trending in the direction of requiring more climate-re-
lated disclosures. 
B. Amend Regulation S-K 
Another solution is to amend Regulation S-K—the regulation 
that provides instructions for filing forms.208 The SEC took one step 
towards this in 2016 when they issued the Concept Release, seek-
ing public comments on whether the SEC should consider line-item 
disclosure for sustainability issues, as well as materiality stand-
ards of sustainability factors.209 This alternative helps with the 
confusion around what exactly needs to be disclosed and provides 
less freedom to management to make those decisions. However, an 
 
207 See Letter from Larry Fink, supra note 8. 
208 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2020). 
209 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,924. 
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amendment to the regulation must go through notice and comment 
rulemaking, which could take some time.210  
The SEC would also have the opportunity to require alignment 
with the TCFD Recommendations in the regulation. The different 
parts of the TCFD Recommendations can be added as instructions 
for what must be disclosed under certain paragraphs of various 
Items under Regulation S-K. For example, the SEC includes in-
structions in Item 302, “Supplementary Financial Information,”211 
providing disclosures recommended by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board.212 Alternatively, the SEC can add an additional 
discussion section that requires analysis of climate-related issues, 
similar to the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A).213 
Amending Regulation S-K to include disclosure requirements 
for climate-related risks and opportunities may cause challenges 
based on Chevron deference.214 A Chevron analysis involves a 
three-step test used when an agency rule interprets its substantive 
statute. Step Zero allows a particular regulation to qualify for 
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated au-
thority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.215 Step One asks 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue.216 If Congress 
spoke directly to the issue, the court, as well as the agency, cannot 
substitute its own interpretation for that of Congress.217 For Step 
Two, if the court determines that Congress did not directly address 
the precise question at issue, the court must decide whether the 
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of 
 
210 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018); see Am. Mining Cong. 
v. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
211 17 C.F.R § 229.302. 
212 The FASB is the independent organization, designated by the SEC, that 
publishes Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for use by public 
companies. About the FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, 
https://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/WN8W-ZH85]. 
213 See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. 
L.J. 923, 956–58 (2019) (proposing a “Sustainability Discussion & Analysis” 
(SD&A) section of the annual report). 
214 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
215 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001). 
216 Chevron, 837 U.S. at 842. 
217 Id. at 842–43. 
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the statute.”218 If the agency interpretation is reasonable, the court 
cannot substitute its own for that of the agency.219 
Step Zero is satisfied because the Securities Act expressly 
states that “[t]he Commission shall adopt regulations under this 
subsection requiring each issuer of an asset-backed security to dis-
close, for each tranche or class of security, information regarding 
the assets backing that security.”220 The amended regulation will 
also satisfy Step One because Congress, through the Securities Act, 
did not speak to the issue; rather Congress gave the SEC full au-
thority to determine what information must be disclosed. The 
amended regulation encounters trouble under Step Two: whether 
the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable and a permissible construc-
tion of the Securities Act. Interpreting the Securities Act to allow 
the SEC to require disclosure of climate-related risks and opportu-
nities is entirely permissible because of the broad discretion Con-
gress gave the SEC in determining what information must be dis-
closed. Challengers of this construction of the statute can bring 
weak arguments that the 1933 Congress did not intend, and could 
not have foreseen, the Securities Act encompassing uncertain risks 
like climate change. However, the 1933 Congress “recognized that 
investors must have access to accurate information important to 
making investment decisions. . . .”221 Just as the 1933 Congress left 
broad discretion to the SEC to determine what information must 
be disclosed, using the phrase “accurate information” similarly 
supports a broad interpretation of the statute. Disclosure of cli-
mate-related risks is necessary to provide investors with accurate 
information and is permissible under a broad interpretation of the 
intent of the Securities Act. 
C. Promulgate a New Regulation 
Another option is for the SEC to promulgate a new regulation 
pursuant to the Securities Act222 that deals solely with climate-re-
lated risks and opportunities. This solution will also take some 
time because it must go through notice and comment 
 
218 Id. at 843. 
219 Id. 
220 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c)(1) (2018). 
221 2016 Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23,921. 
222 15 U.S.C. § 77s. 
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rulemaking.223 This regulation would be an in-depth framework 
aligned with the TCFD Recommendations. Just as the Concept Re-
lease was looking to do, a new regulation should also provide un-
ambiguous materiality standards for climate-related risks and op-
portunities. The standards would provide management with less 
discretion and would provide investors with better opportunities to 
bring derivative lawsuits and the SEC with more power to bring 
enforcement actions.224 
Promulgating a regulation that deals solely with climate-re-
lated risks and opportunities may also encounter challenges based 
on Chevron.225 The arguments against this administrative alterna-
tive are virtually the same as the arguments against amending 
Regulation S-K. Steps Zero and One are satisfied because Con-
gress, in the Securities Act, expressly gave the SEC full discretion 
to determine what information must be disclosed. By giving the 
SEC full authority, Congress did not speak to the issue and the 
analysis can proceed to Chevron Step Two. Under Step Two, inter-
preting the delegation provision of the Securities Act to allow the 
SEC to require climate-related disclosures is entirely permissible 
under a broad interpretation of the intent of the Securities Act be-
cause it will provide investors with accurate information.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The era of relying on voluntary disclosure programs with lim-
ited government oversight must come to an end. Full disclosure—
of both climate-related risks and opportunities—is essential to 
providing investors with the necessary information required to fi-
nance our future’s health, and to ensure a swift transition to a low-
carbon economy. Regulations that require the disclosure of a more 
complete set of information help cure the market inefficiencies 
caused by distorted and imperfect information.226 The current lack 
of information surrounding climate-related risks and opportunities 
 
223 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
224 “A suit brought by shareholders on behalf of a corporation to enforce cor-
porate rights against directors or other insiders, or to assert rights of the corpo-
ration in the absence of corporate action to protect such rights.” Derivative Suit, 
BARRON’S DICTIONARY OF FIN. & INV. TERMS (10th ed. 2018). 
225 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
226 Czarnezki & Fiedler, supra note 171, at 36–37. 
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is one such inefficiency; however, a mandatory reporting frame-
work will help correct this inefficiency.  
Passing legislation that aligns mandatory reporting with the 
TCFD Recommendations will have the most beneficial national 
and global impacts by promoting uniformity. It will cure the mar-
ket inefficiencies caused by the lack of or incomplete information 
and will allow investors to properly allocate capital in order to mit-
igate climate change’s physical and financial effects on the U.S. 
Creating a mandatory disclosure framework will also allow U.S. 
regulators to take control of climate-related disclosures for the U.S. 
capital markets before other jurisdictions can impose disclosure re-
gimes on U.S. issuers and investors. Regardless of what type of law 
is chosen or what disclosure framework is used, a mandatory re-
porting scheme for climate-related risks and opportunities is 
needed to prevent the most severe consequences of climate change, 
and it is needed fast. 
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IX. APPENDIX A: TCFD RECOMMENDED 
DISCLOSURES227 
 
 
227 TCFD RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 14. 
Governance Strategy Risk  Management 
Metrics and  
Targets 
 
(a) Describe 
the board’s 
oversight 
of climate-
related 
risks and 
opportuni-
ties 
(b) Describe 
manage-
ment’s 
role in as-
sessing 
and man-
aging cli-
mate-re-
lated risks 
and oppor-
tunities 
 
(a) Describe the 
climate-re-
lated risks 
and opportu-
nities the or-
ganization 
has identi-
fied over the 
short, me-
dium, and 
long term 
(b) Describe the 
impact of cli-
mate-related 
risks and op-
portunities 
on the organ-
ization’s 
businesses, 
strategy, and 
financial 
planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Describe the 
organiza-
tion’s pro-
cesses for 
identifying 
and assessing 
climate-re-
lated risks 
(b) Describe the 
organiza-
tion’s pro-
cesses for 
managing cli-
mate-related 
risks 
(c) Describe how 
processes for 
identifying, 
assessing, 
and manag-
ing climate-
related risks 
are inte-
grated into 
the organiza-
tion’s overall 
risk manage-
ment 
 
(a) Disclose the 
metrics used 
by the organ-
ization to as-
sess climate-
related risks 
and opportu-
nities in line 
with its 
strategy and 
risk manage-
ment process 
(b) Disclose 
Scope 1, 
Scope 2, and, 
if appropri-
ate, Scope 3 
greenhouse 
gas (GHG) 
emissions, 
and the re-
lated risks 
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(c) Describe the 
resilience of 
the organiza-
tion’s strat-
egy, taking 
into consider-
ation differ-
ent climate-
related sce-
narios, in-
cluding a 2 
degrees Cel-
sius or lower 
scenario 
 
(c) Describe the 
targets used 
by the organ-
ization to 
manage cli-
mate-related 
risks and op-
portunities 
and perfor-
mance 
against tar-
gets 
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X. APPENDIX B: LANGUAGE IN THE CRDA OF 
2019 THAT ALIGNS WITH THE TCFD 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
228 Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S.2075, 116th Cong. § 5(a) (2019) 
(Section (s)(2)(B) of the proposed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018)). Section 5(a) of the CRDA proposes to add a Sub-
section (s) to Section 78m of the Exchange Act. The following citations to subsec-
tion (s) are in reference to this proposed amendment. 
229 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)). 
232 Id. § 5(a) (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)). 
233 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(B)). 
236 Id. § 6(a)(2)(A)(v). 
Governance Strategy Risk  Management 
Metrics and 
Targets 
 
There is one 
subsection 
that comes 
close: “a de-
scription of 
any estab-
lished corpo-
rate govern-
ance processes 
and structures 
to identify, as-
sess, and 
manage cli-
mate-related 
risks.”228 
 
Part b) is partly 
satisfied by: “the 
identification of, 
the evaluation of 
potential financial 
impacts of, and any 
risk management 
strategies relating 
to–(i) physical risks 
posed to the cov-
ered issuer by cli-
mate change; and 
(ii) transition risks 
posed to the cov-
ered issuer by cli-
mate change.”229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part a) is satisfied 
by: “the identifica-
tion of, the evalua-
tion of potential fi-
nancial impacts of, 
and any risk man-
agement strategies 
relating to–(i) phys-
ical risks posed to 
the covered issuer 
by climate change; 
and (ii) transition 
risks posed to the 
covered issuer by 
climate change,”232 
and “a description 
of any established 
corporate govern-
ance processes and 
structures to 
identify, assess, 
and manage cli-
mate-related 
risks.”233 
 
Part a) is satis-
fied by: “re-
quire that a 
covered issuer . 
. . incorporate 
into the disclo-
sure . . . a dis-
cussion of the 
short-, me-
dium, and 
long-term resil-
ience of any 
risk manage-
ment strategy, 
and the evolu-
tion of applica-
ble risk met-
rics, of the 
covered issuer 
under each sce-
nario...”236 
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230 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(D)). 
231 Id. § 6(a)(2)(B). 
234 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(A)). 
235 Id. (to be incorporated as Section (s)(2)(E)). 
237 Id. § 6(a)(1)(B). 
238 Id. § 6(a)(2)(C)(ii)(V)–(VI). 
 
Part c) is satisfied 
by: “a description of 
the resilience of the 
strategy of the cov-
ered issuer for ad-
dressing climate 
risks, taking into 
account different 
climate scenar-
ios,”230 and “con-
sider, when prepar-
ing any qualitative 
or quantitative risk 
analysis statement 
contained in the 
disclosure– (i) a 
baseline scenario 
that includes physi-
cal impacts of cli-
mate change; (ii) a 
well below 1.5 de-
grees scenario; and 
(iii) any additional 
climate analysis 
scenario considered 
appropriate by the 
Commission, in 
consultation with 
the appropriate cli-
mate principals.”231 
 
 
Part b) is also satis-
fied by “the identifi-
cation of, the evalu-
ation of potential 
financial impacts 
of, and any risk 
management strat-
egies relating to–(i) 
physical risks 
posed to the cov-
ered issuer by cli-
mate change; and 
(ii) transition risks 
posed to the cov-
ered issuer by cli-
mate change.”234 
 
Part c) is satisfied 
by: “a description of 
how climate risk is 
incorporated into 
the overall risk 
management strat-
egy of the covered 
issuer.”235 
 
Parts b) and c) 
are partly sat-
isfied with re-
quirements 
that an issuer 
disclose direct 
and indirect 
GHG emis-
sions,237 as 
well as water 
withdrawal 
and regional 
scarcity.238 
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